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What Disabilities are Protected
Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973?
BY DAVID A. LARSON*
It can be difficult for an employer or a recipient of federal
funds to determine exactly what types of disabilities are protected
by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.' Relevant literature has not given
a great deal of attention to this specific question. 2 Recent cases,
however, provide additional information that can assist in deter-
mining which disabilities are protected.
The question of what is a protected handicap differs from the
question of whether a handicapped person is also "qualified." 3 This
article focuses on the threshold question of determining whether
a handicap actually exists, 4 concentrating on the Rehabilitation Act
* Associate Professor, School of Management, Millsaps College, Jackson, Missis-
sippi. David A. Larson is a member of the Illinois, Minnesota, and American Bar Asso-
ciations and practiced with the Minneapolis, Minnesota law firm of Meagher, Geer, Markham,
Anderson, Adamson, Flaskamp and Brennan. He is a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of DePauw
University and was graduated from the University of Illinois College of Law.
1. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1985).
2. For an article devoted in part to defining the term handicap, see Comment,
Employment Discrimination-Analyzing Handicap Discrimination Claims: The Right Tools
for the Job, 62 N.C.L. REV. 535 (1984). For a discussion of handicaps specifically in light
of E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980), see, Haines, E.E.
Black, Ltd. v. Marshall: A Penetrating Interpretation of 'Handicapped Individual' For Sec-
tions 503 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and for Various State Equal Employment
Opportunity Statutes, 16 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 527 (1983); see also Note, The Rehabilitation
Act of 1973: Who Is Handicapped Under Federal Law?, 16 U.S.F.L. Rev. 653 (1982).
3. "Qualified" handicapped persons are those persons protected under § 793
(addressing government contractors in excess of $2,500) of the Rehabilitation Act. "Oth-
erwise qualified" persons are protected under § 794 (addressing programs receiving
federal financial assistance). See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397
(1979) (nursing program denied admission to plaintiff with serious hearing disability because
of her failure to meet legitimate physical requirements. Denial upheld in that otherwise
qualified person is one who is able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of a
handicap).
4. The term "handicap" will appear as a frequent reference in this article. Certain
groups may prefer the adjective "disabled" and the author recognizes and acknowledges
that preference. "Handicapped" will often appear because the article represents an attempt
to explain how that particular term, which was selected by the legislature, has been defined
by the courts.
There is only limited discussion of various disabilities that have been reviewed under
state anti-discrimination statutes. Forty-five states have statutes prohibiting discrimination
against the handicapped. Comment, supra note 2, at 540 n.34 (citing PRESIDENT'S COMM.
ON EMPLOYMENT OF THE HANDICAPPED, SELECTED STATE AND FED. LAWS AFFECTING EM-
PLOYMENT AND CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 68-80 (1980)). However, the
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of 1973. The definitions of protected handicaps found in the Re-
breadth and language of these protections differs substantially. Compare the Wisconsin,
Alabama and Arkansas statutes:
Wisconsin § 111.32 Definitions. When used in this subchapter:
(8) "Handicapped individual" means an individual who:
(a) Has a physical or mental impairment which makes achievement unusually
difficult or limits the capacity to work;
(b) Has a record of such impairment; or
(c) Is perceived as having such an impairment.
§ 111.321. Prohibited bases of discrimination. Subject to §§ 111.33 to
111.36, no employer, labor organization, employment agency, licensing agency
or other person may engage in any active employment discrimination as spec-
ified in § 111.322 against any individual on the basis of age, race, creed, color,
handicap, marital status, sex, national origin, ancestry, arrest record or con-
viction record.
§ 111.34. Handicap; exceptions and special cases
(I) Employment discrimination because of handicap includes, but is not lim-
ited to:
(a) Contributing a lesser amount to the fringe benefits, including life or dis-
ability insurance coverage, of any employe because of the employe's handicap;
or
(b) Refusing to reasonably accommodate an employe's or prospective em-
ploye's handicap unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation
would pose a hardship on the employer's program, enterprise or business.
(2Xa) Notwithstanding § 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because
of handicap to refuse to hire, employ, admit or license any individual, to bar
or terminate from employment, membership or licensure any individual, or
to discriminate against any individual in promotion, compensation or in terms,
conditions or privileges of employment if the handicap is reasonably related
to the individual's ability to adequately undertake the job-related responsi-
bilities of that individual's employment, membership or licensure.
(b) In evaluating whether a handicapped individual can adequately undertake
the job-related responsibilities of a particular job, membership or licensed
activity, the present and future safety of the individual, of the individual's
coworkers and, if applicable, of the general public may be considered. How-
ever, this evaluation shall be made on an individual case-by-case basis and
may not be made by a general rule which prohibits the employment or licensure
of handicapped individuals in general or a particular class of handicapped
individuals.
(c) If the employment, membership or licensure involves a special duty of
care for the safety of the general public, including but not limited to em-
ployment with a common carrier, this special duty of care may be considered
in evaluating whether the employe or applicant can adequately undertake the
job-related responsibilities of a particular job, membership or licensed activity.
However, this evaluation shall be made on an individual case-by-case basis
and may not be made by a general rule which prohibits the employment or
licensure of handicapped individuals in general or a particular class of hand-
icapped individuals.
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 111.32(8)(a), (b), (c), § 111.321, § 111.34 (West 1974 & Supp. 1986)
(covering all employers and both physical and mental impairments).
Alabama § 21-7-1 Declaration of Policy.
It is the policy of this state to encourage and enable the blind, the visually
1986] Protected Disabilities
habilitation Act of 1973 and in the corresponding regulations are
also examined. Additionally, this article discusses court decisions
addressing different types of disabilities in order to provide a clearer
sense of what is being recognized as a protected handicap.
I. THE REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973
Sections 503 and 504 (29 United States Code sections 793 and
794, respectively) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [hereinafter
Rehabilitation Act] establish protections under different circum-
handicapped and the otherwise physically disabled to participate fully in the
social and economic life of the state and to engage in remunerative employment.
ALA. CODE § 21-7-1 (1984) (limited to physical disability).
Arkansas § 82-2901 Policy of state.
It is the policy of this State to accord visually handicapped, hearing impaired
and other physically handicapped persons all rights and privileges of other
persons with respect to the use of public streets, highways, sidewalks, public
buildings, public facilities, public carriers, public housing accomodations [sic],
public amusement and resort areas and other public areas to which the public
is invited, subject only to the limitations and conditions established by law
and applicable to all persons, and subject to the special limitations and con-
ditions prescribed herein for visually handicapped and hearing impaired and
otherwise handicapped persons. It is further the policy of this State that visually
handicapped, hearing impaired or other physically handicapped persons shall
be employed in State service, the service of political subdivisions of this State,
in the public schools, and in all other employment supported in whole or in
part by public funds, on the same terms and conditions as persons who are
not visually handicapped, hearing impaired or otherwise handicapped, unless
it is shown that the visual, hearing or other handicap of a person prevents
the performance of the work involved.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-2901 (1979 and Supp. 1985) (limited to physical disability and state
employment or employers receiving state assistance). As a result of such differences in
statutory language, disabilities recognized as protected under one state's statute may not be
recognized under another state's statute.
See Advocates v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 67 Ill. App. 3d 512, 517-18 (1978), wherein the
Illinois Appellate Court stated:
We are aware that our interpretation of the dictionary definition [of "hand-
icap"] places us in conflict with the reasoning of the Wisconsin Circuit Court
in Chrysler Outboard Corp. v. Department of Industry, Labor & Human Re-
lations (1976), 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 344. The Wisconsin statute
prohibiting employment discrimination against handicapped individuals (Fair
Employment Code, Wis. Stat. Ann. § 111.31, et seq. (1974)), like Illinois'
Equal Opportunity for the Handicapped Act, does not contain an effective
definition of what constitutes a handicap .... From this language, we think
it is clear that the Wisconsin Circuit Court followed the approach which the
plaintiff has offered and which we have rejected.
The Wisconsin court decided their case before the Wisconsin legislature added subsection
(8) defining handicap by amendment to Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.32 (West 1974 & Supp. 1986).
Subsection (8), defining handicap, is still quite general however, in that it protects im-
pairments that make "achievement unusually difficult or [limit] the capacity to work."
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stances.' Section 503 states that any private employer entering into
a government contract or subcontract with a value in excess of
$2,500.00 must pursue both a policy of non-discrimination against
the handicapped and an affirmative action policy. 6 Section 504 pro-
hibits handicap discrimination in any program receiving federal fi-
nancial assistance. 7 In order to manage a lawful business, it thus
becomes necessary to determine specifically what persons are pro-
tected by these sections.
The Rehabilitation Act provides its own definitional section:
(7)(A) Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (B), the
term "handicapped individual" means any individual who (i)
has a physical or mental disability which for such individual
constitutes or results in a substantial handicap to employment
and (ii) can reasonably be expected to benefit in terms of em-
ployability from vocational rehabilitation services provided pur-
suant to subchapters I and III of this chapter.
(B) Subject to the second sentence of this subparagraph, the
term "handicapped individual" means, for purposes of sub-
chapters IV and V of this chapter, any person who (i) has a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one
or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record
of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an
impairment. For purposes of sections 793 and 794 of this title
as such sections relate to employment, such term does not in-
clude any individual who is an alcoholic or drug abuser whose
current use of alcohol or drugs prevents such individual from
performing the duties of the job in question or whose em-
ployment, by reason of such current alcohol or drug abuse,
would constitute a direct threat to property or the safety of
others.'
Severe handicaps are further defined:
(13) The term "severe handicap" means the disability which
requires multiple services over an extended period of time and
results from amputation, blindness, cancer, cerebral palsy, cys-
tic fibrosis, deafness, heart disease, hemiplegia, mental retar-
dation, mental illness, multiple sclerosis, muscular dystrophy,
neurological disorders (including stroke and epilepsy), para-
5. For purposes of manageability, the discussion of protected disabilities will be
limited to these two sections.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1978).
7. Id. § 794 (1978).
8. Id. § 706(13) (1984).
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plegia, quadriplegia and other spinal cord conditions, renal fail-
ure, respiratory or pulmonary dysfunction, and any other
disability specified by the Secretary in regulations he shall pre-
scribe. 9
Thus the statute specifically identifies certain severe disabilities as
conditions that satisfy the statute's definition of handicap. Con-
sidering every imaginable disorder, however, it is obvious more
guidance is required. The major concern is with section 7(B)(i),
cited above, which asserts that a handicapped individual "has a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or
more of such person's major life activities." Federal regulations
further define which persons are covered by this language.
The Department of Labor issued regulations to further define
the application of section 503. The definitional section states:
'Handicapped individual' means any person who (1) has a phys-
ical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or
more of such person's major life activities, (2) has a record
of such impairment, or (3) is regarded as having such an im-
pairment. For purposes of this part, a handicapped individual
is 'substantially limited' if he or she is likely to experience
difficulty in securing, retaining or advancing in employment
because of a handicap.
0
This definition further refers the reader to Appendix A, which con-
tains guidelines for the application of this definition. The guidelines
state:
'Life activities ' may be considered to include communication,
ambulation, selfcare, socialization, education, vocational train-
ing, employment, transportation, adapting to housing, etc. For
the purpose of section 503 of the Act, primary attention is
given to those life activities that affect employability.
The phrase 'substantially limits ' means the degree that the
impairment affects employability. A handicapped individual
who is likely to experience difficulty in securing retaining or
advancing in employment would be considered substantially
limited."
The President issued Executive Order 12,250 to implement the non-
discriminatory provisions of federal statutes, including section 504
9. Id.
10. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.2 (1985).
11. Id. (Appendix A) (1985).
1986]
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of the Rehabilitation Act. 2 This order directed- executive agencies
to draft regulations or issue guidelines for those receiving federal
financial assistance from each agency. 3 Therefore, in cases in-
volving specific agencies one must refer to the exact regulations or
guidelines issued by that agency. That same Executive Order em-
powered the Department of Justice to draft regulations to coor-
dinate the overall implementation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act.' 4 The Department of Justice issued its own regulations pur-
suant to the President's delegation of authority and included a
definitional section that attempts to more specifically describe pro-
tected disabilities. These regulations state:
(b) . . . (1) "Physical or mental impairment" means: (i) Any
physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body
12. Exec. Order No. 12,250, 3 C.F.R. 298 (1980). "By the authority vested in me as
President ... and in order to provide ... for the bonsistent and effective implementation
of various laws prohibiting discriminatory practices in Federal programs and programs re-
ceiving Federal financial assistance, it is hereby ordered as follows." Id.
13. Exec. Order 12,250, § 1-402. "Each Executive agency responsible for implementing
a nondiscrimination provision of a law covered by this Order shall issue appropriate im-
plementing directives (whether in the nature of regulations or policy guidance). To the extent
permitted by law, they shall be consistent with the requirements prescribed by the Attorney
General pursuant to this Order and shall be subject to the approval of the Attorney General,
who may require that some or all of them be submitted for approval before taking effect."
Id.
To review the regulations drafted by agencies pursuant to the directive in § 1-402
above, see 45 C.F.R. § 84.1 et seq. (1986) (Department of Health and Human Services);
22 C.F.R. § 142.1 et seq. (1985) (Department of State); 43 C.F.R. § 17.1 et seq. (1985)
(Department of the Interior); 45 C.F.R. § 605.0 et seq. (1985) (National Science Foundation);
10 C.F.R. § 4.1 et seq. (1986) (Nuclear Regulatory Commission); 7 C.F.R. § 15.1 et seq.
(1986) (Office of the Secretary, USDA); 32 C.F.R. § 56.1 et seq. (1985) (Office of Secretary
of Defense); 29 C.F.R. § 32.1 et seq. (1985) (Office of Secretary of Labor); 38 C.F.R. § 18.1
et seq. (1985) (Veterans Administrations); 45 C.F.R. § 1232.1 et seq. (1985) (ACTION); 22
C.F.R. § 217.1 et seq. (1986) (Agency for International Development, IDCA); 15 C.F.R.
§ 8b.1 et seq. (1986) (Office of the Secretary Commerce); 34 C.F.R. § 104.1 et seq. (1985)
(Office for Gull Rights, Education); 10 C.F.R. § 1040.1 et seq. (1986) (Department of Energy);
49 C.F.R. § 27.1 et seq. (1985) (Office of the Secretary of Transportation); 40 C.F.R. § 7.10
et seq. (1985) (Environmental Protection Agency); 11 C.F.R. § 6.101 et seq. (1986) (Federal
Election Commission); 14 C.F.R. § 1251.00 et seq. (1986) (National Aeronautics and Space
Administration); 45 C.F.R. § 1151.1 et seq. (1985) (National Foundation of the Arts and
Humanities); 45 C.F.R. § 1170.1 et seq. (1985) (National Foundation on the Arts and Hu-
manities); 13 C.F.R. § 113.1 et seq. (1985) (Small Business Administration); 18 C.F.R.
§ 1307.1 et seq. (1985) (Tennessee Valley Authority).
14. Executive Order No. 12,250, § 1-201. "The Attorney General shall coordinate
the implementation and enforcement by Executive agencies of various nondiscrimination
provisions of the following laws: . . . (c) Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
as amended (29 U.S.C. 794)." Id.
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systems: Neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs;
respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; repro-
ductive; digestive; genitourinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin;
and endocrine; or (ii) any mental or psychological disorder,
such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional
or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities. The term
"physical or mental impairment" includes, but is not limited
to, such diseases and conditions as orthopedic, visual, speech,
and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular
dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes,
mental retardation, emotional illness, and drug addiction and
alcoholism.
(2) "Major life activities" means functions such as caring for
one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,
speaking, breathing, learning and working."5
These definitions provide a better understanding of what disabilities
are protected. The critical concern, however, is the manner in which
courts have responded to assertions that particular disabilities should
be protected.
II. CASES DEFINING HANDICAPPED UNDER THE
REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973
This section begins with a discussion of why employers seldom
challenge allegations that an individual is handicapped. It then fo-
cuses upon specific court decisions that define protected handicaps.
Included, are cases in which defendants have successfully challenged
plaintiffs' claims of a protected handicap. This section also explains
the approach a defendant can use to challenge a plaintiff's efforts
to establish a protected handicap, discussing at length how to de-
termine whether a handicap exists.
Frequently cases brought under the Rehabilitation Act do not
raise questions as to whether individuals are handicapped. Rather,
the employer concedes that a handicap does exist. For example, in
Strathie v. Department of Transportation,6 the plaintiff wore a
hearing aid in violation of one of the Department of Transpor-
tation's regulations. Without the hearing aid, Strathie could not
pass the department's hearing requirements. This case is illustrative
of many cases wherein it is "undisputed that Strathie [or any plaintiff]
15. 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(1)(2) (1985).
16. 716 F.2d 227 (3rd Cir. 1983).
1986]
Memphis State University Law Review
is a handicapped person, and that his license was suspended solely
by reason of his handicap."'' 7 Defendants accepted the existence of
a handicap and instead focused upon the question of whether the
plaintiff was "otherwise qualified."' 8 The plaintiff in Strathie had
a disability that was expressly within the regulations issued by the
Department of Justice for section 504.
The plaintiff in Longoria v. Harris'9 was a 37 year old male
who had his right leg amputated below the kneecap. Plaintiff left
his employment with the Harlingen Consolidated Independent School
District due to an improperly fitted prosthesis, which caused blis-
tering. After several intervening jobs, plaintiff reapplied to the school
and was informed that he could not qualify as a bus driver because
of the loss of his leg. Plaintiff had previously served as a bus driver
when he had worked for the school district four years earlier. As
in Strathie, the employer acknowledged the existence of a protected
disability and the case instead focused upon whether plaintiff was
a "qualified individual" and not whether plaintiff had a protected
disability. 20
A. Why is it Uncommon to Challenge the
Existence of a Physical Handicap?
Where there has been an allegation of a protected impairment,
defendants have appeared hesitant to challenge that allegation. If
17. Id. at 230.
18. Id.
19. 554 F. Supp. 102 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
20. Id. at 104. Fitzgerald v. Green Valley Area Educ. Agency, 589 F. Supp. 1130
(S.D. Iowa 1984) provides an additional example of an employer conceding that a handicap
exists. Plaintiff was a multiply handicapped individual with his most apparent handicap
being left side hemiplegia due to cerebral palsy. This did not amount, however, to complete
paralysis and plaintiff did have sufficient use of the left arm, hand and leg to be able to
walk without assistance and to perform such functions as lifting children and driving. He
was licensed to drive without restrictions in Vermont, was previously licensed to drive in
New York and had a chauffeur's license in New York.
Plaintiff also suffered from nocturnal epilepsy and dyslexia. The epilepsy, however,
was controlled by medication and plaintiff never had a seizure while awake. Dyslexia, which
is a reading disability, prevented plaintiff from having the ability to read at a level above
sixth grade when plaintiff did his own reading visually. In the same manner as many blind
individuals, plaintiff was able to compensate for this problem by using tape-recordings and
readers. In fact, plaintiff had obtained a bachelors and a masters degree. There was no
evidence that the dyslexia had hindered his ability to work as a teacher's aide or as a substitute
teacher for children whose reading skills were less than his. Once again there was no dispute
that plaintiff was a "handicapped individual." Rather, the issue was whether plaintiff was
"otherwise qualified." Id. at 1135-36. See also Stutts v. Freeman, 694 F.2d 666 (11th Cir.
1983) (plaintiff's dyslexia resulted in low score on employer's written apprenticeship ex-




one is familiar with personal injury defense work, however, one
knows that it is common for defendants to acquire adverse medical
examinations as a check on the plaintiff's assertions of injury. In
the area of handicaps, however, there is little case law chronicling
such challenges. It is clear that if a defendant can establish that
the plaintiff does not suffer from a protected handicap, the defend-
ant will prevail. Why have defendants not aggressively attacked
plaintiffs' allegations of disabilities?
The first possible reason is that few cases are litigated unless
the plaintiff is clearly handicapped. This occurs because of a subtle
reason that may affect only some cases and which is a consequence
of a common societal attitude. Physical and mental disabilities often
acquire a social stigma that may alienate and isolate the sufferer
far more effectively than the limitations imposed by the disability
itself. Medical uncertainty about the exact nature of a disability,
misinformation, or even simple ignorance regarding available in-
formation may cause people without serious disabilities to avoid
the disabled. Few people would eagerly invite this type of avoidance
attitude.
A personal injury damage lawsuit, on the other hand, involves
merely a stroke of bad luck rather than any social stigma. Any
healthy, so-called ordinary person may suffer a personal injury.
Furthermore, a personal injury cannot be passed on to anyone else.
Labeling oneself as an accident victim may not alienate others as
completely as disclosing a handicap and thus people may be more
willing to make claims as a result of personal injury. There is also
a sense of righteousness in a personal injury lawsuit. The injured
person was wronged and is simply asking for what they are due.
The marginal personal injury claim is thus more likely to fit nicely
with our concept of fault-based liability.
Genetic or disease-based disabilities, however, suggest a sense
of inferiority to some persons. Furthermore, in the employment
context, one is not suing the person that is responsible for the
disability, but rather someone that refuses to accommodate that
disability. Few people are enthusiastically awaiting the opportunity
to publicly declare a condition that may involve a social stigma
and then additionally announce that they cannot function without
help, or in other words, without reasonable accommodation. A
partially disabled person may find it much less burdensome to qui-
etly struggle with his or her disability, make excuses, and suffer
the consequences rather than to publicly declare his condition. As
a result, marginal disability claims are not litigated.
1986]
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Another reason that there does not appear to be a great deal
of case law involving challenges to plaintiffs' allegations of pro-
tected disabilities may be the fact that defendants have a second
line of defense. A defendant can concede that a disability exists
and still prevail in the lawsuit. Furthermore, aggressively chal-
lenging a plaintiff's allegation of disability may adversely affect
the defendant's position by making defendant appear insensitive
and unsympathetic. By conceding the plaintiff's disability, the
defendant can forego this challenge, recognize and sympathize with
the plaintiff's disability, but still continue to explain that unfor-
tunately the plaintiff was not "otherwise qualified" and simply
cannot perform the job. The defendant can then avoid the rather
nebulous problem of trying to determine at what point does an
impairment amount to a "handicap." The defendant can instead
focus upon what the plaintiff apparently can or cannot do and
assert that the plaintiff is not "otherwise qualified."
Finally, many potential plaintiffs may perceive the marginal case
as extremely difficult to win. A plaintiff must first show that he
or she has an impairment that substantially limits a major life ac-
tivity. That same plaintiff must then come back and show, however,
that he or she is not so handicapped that a particular job cannot
be properly performed. 2' A concentrated effort to convince a skept-
ical court that a disability actually exists may also have the un-
intended result of convincing that same body that the handicap
prevents effective performance of a job.
B. Weight and Left-Handedness
Although it may appear that few plaintiffs are making hand-
icapped claims in marginal cases, such claims do exist. In the fol-
lowing cases, one plaintiff attempted to establish he was handicapped
as a result of his left-handedness and another alleged that his high
body weight, resulting from weight-lifting, made him handicapped.
Tudyman v. United Airlines2 reviewed the charges of a 5 '7 1/2"
man who weighed 15 pounds over the maximum weight per-
mitted by United Airlines for a man of his height. Plaintiff brought
suit alleging he was a handicapped individual and that his dismissal
violated section 504.
21. For a reference to this "catch 22" aspect of § 504, see Doe v. Region 13
Mental Health-Mental Retardation Comm., 704 F.2d 1402, 1408 n.6 (5th Cir. 1983). See infra
notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
22. 608 F. Supp. 739 (D.C. Cal. 1984).
[Vol. 16
Protected Disabilities
Plaintiff was not an individual in poor physical shape. To the
contrary, the reason he exceeded the weight limit was that he was
an avid bodybuilder with a low percentage of body fat and a high
percentage of muscle. The court denied plaintiff's claim for several
reasons. The failure to qualify for a single job does not constitute
being limited in a major life activity.23 Furthermore, plaintiff's al-
leged "unique musculo-skelital [sic] system and body composition"
were not the result of physiological disorders, cosmetic disfigure-
ment or anatomical loss as described in the applicable federal reg-
ulations. 24 Finally, suggesting that an involuntary weight problem
due to a cause such as glandular malfunction might be viewed
differently, the court concluded that this plaintiff's weight was ar-
rived at by choice. Section 504 evidences an intention not to protect
individuals with voluntary impairments in that it excludes certain
current drug and alcohol abusers from protection.
25
The plaintiff in Torres v. Bolger 21 alleged that his employer
terminated him on the basis of his handicap, specifically his left-
handedness. Although he was able to deliver street mail with his
right hand, plaintiff had difficulty using that hand. His continued
slowness in delivering mail resulted in his discharge.
The court stated that plaintiffs have the burden of establishing
by a preponderance of the evidence that they are "handicapped
individuals. ' 27 The court concluded that left-handedness is no more
an impairment than being right-handed or ambidextrous. Plaintiff
was in perfect health, was able to perform a wide variety of tasks
without apparent difficulty and was an accomplished college athlete.
The acceptance of plaintiff's theory would have rendered futile
federal programs of vocational rehabilitation and bound Congress
to a wholly unimaginable civil rights violation.
2
Additionally, the court asserted that an impairment that inter-
feres with a particular job, but does not otherwise decrease an
individual's ability to obtain satisfactory employment, is not "sub-
23. Id. at 745-46.
24. Id. at 746 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.30)(2)(i)).
25. Id. (citing 1978 amendments to Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to support its position
that Congress did not intend to protect body-builders when it passed the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973. The court did not address the assertion that drug dependence and alcoholism are
themselves not voluntary conditions.).
26. 610 F. Supp. 593 (D.C. Tex. 1985).
27. Id. at 596.
28. Id.
19861
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stantially limiting" for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act. 29 Thus
plaintiff's claim failed in two respects. His left-handedness was
not an impairment and it did not substantially limit any major life
activity.
C. Drug or Alcohol Abuse
Drug and alcohol abusers do not fit nicely into everyone's con-
ception of a handicapped person. There are two complicating as-
pects to drug and alcohol abuse. First, there is an elusive aspect
to this alleged disability. When drugs and alcohol are not consumed,
the user may appear fully capable. Additionally, there is often a
belief that the abuser's condition is voluntary and thus not deserving
of protection. The severe social stigma that accompanies disclosure
makes it unlikely that anyone would litigate an occasional misuse
problem 30
Needless to say, cases of drug use or alcohol abuse often arouse
intense emotion. As the following court decisions illustrate, persons
with such problems do fall within the protections of the Rehabil-
itation Act.
In Davis v. Boucher,3 plaintiff Salvatore D'Elia was a former
narcotics addict who was enrolled in a methadone program. D'Elia
had filed a job application with the City of Philadelphia. Random
urine samples required by federal law showed that he was not using
drugs other than methadone. He was denied employment, however,
because of his history of drug use.
The City argued "that Congress did not intend drug addicts to
be included within the definition of handicapped for purposes of
section 504. 132 Although there were no cases on point, the court
determined that drug addiction fell within the terms of the statute.
The court stated that:
29. Id. at 596-97.
30. Recent disclosures by respected national figures (e.g., Betty Ford) and the tragedy
of addictive behavior (e.g., John Belushi) have eased the stigma and encouraged disclosure.
Yet the prospect of a plaintiff arguing she is a drug abuser and the employer arguing she
is not appears unlikely.
31. 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Penn. 1978).
32. Id. at 795. The court decided this case prior to amendments to the Rehabilitation
Act that expressly include alcoholics and drug abusers as "handicapped individuals" as long
as current use of alcohol or drugs does not prevent performance of job responsibilities and
as long as employment does not constitute direct threat to property or safety of others. 29
U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1984).
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It is undisputed that drug addiction substantially affects an
addict's ability to perform major life activities, defined by De-
partment of Health, Education and Welfare regulations sup-
plementing the Act, 42 Fed. Reg. 22686 et seq. (May 4, 1977)
... as "caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walk-
ing, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and work-
ing." Regulation section 84.-2(jX2)(ii) 3
The court further referred to a Department of Health, Education
and Welfare citation wherein the Secretary relied upon a legal opin-
ion from the Attorney General. That opinion declared that drug
addiction and alcoholism are "physical or mental impairments"
within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act and that drug addicts
and alcoholics are handicapped if their impairment substantially
limits one of their major life activities.
3 4
The current amended version of the Rehabilitation Act rec-
ognizes alcoholics and drug abusers as handicapped persons as long
as their substance use does not interfere with their job performance
or pose a threat to others. 5 It is now well-settled in case law that
alcoholism is a handicapping condition for purposes of the dis-
crimination protections of the Rehabilitation Act.
36
D. Mental Disabilities
The protections against discrimination under the Rehabilitation
Act cover not only physical disabilities but also mental disabilities.
In this area, a defendant may be more comfortable arguing that
a plaintiff is not "otherwise qualified" rather than arguing that
the plaintiff does not suffer a mental disability. Given the uncer-
tainty involved in psychology and psychiatry, a defendant may be
reluctant to challenge a plaintiff's claim of disability.
There have been a number of cases recognizing mental disa-
bilities as protected handicaps. Courts protect mental retardation
37
33. 451 F. Supp. at 795.
34. Id. at 796.
35. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1984).
36. Consolidated Freightways, Inc. v. Cedar Rapids Civil Serv. Comm., 366 N.W.2d
522 (Iowa 1985) (citing Rehabilitation Act for assistance in interpreting Cedar Rapids mu-
nicipal ordinance and holding that alcoholism is protected handicap in employment situations
only when it does not prevent proper job performance); Traynor v. Waters, 606 F. Supp.
391 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Whitlock v. Donovan, 598 F. Supp. 126 (D.D.C. 1984); U.S. v. University
Hosp., State Univ. of N.Y. at Stonybrook, 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984).
37. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Penn.
1977) (retarded persons at state institution entitled to protection under the Rehabilitation
Act).
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as well as specific psychological disorders such as organic childhood
schizophrenia38 and the severe depressive neurosis in Doe v. Region
13 Mental Health-Mental Retardation Commission."
In Doe, plaintiff began suffering spells of anxiety, insomnia and
depression in 1977. For a six to eight month period, plaintiff con-
sulted a physician who prescribed sleeping pills. At one point in
1977 she took a potentially lethal overdose. In 1978, she applied
to work with a Gulf Coast Mental Health Center representing that
her general health was excellent and that she had no physical hand-
icap or defect. By all accounts she was a superior employee. Yet
during her entire term of employment she suffered from the same
psychological symptomology. 4°
Finding the Mississippi Gulf Coast something of a culture shock,
the plaintiff continued to experience anxiety and depression. The
heat bothered her, the day-to-day problems of life bothered her,
and she had great difficulties in "coping." She was lonely, had
little money, missed her family, and her apartment was without
telephone or furniture. The depression was particularly notable on
weekends .4'
In November of 1978, three months after moving to her new
home and job, she received psychotherapy. She was diagnosed as
a depressive neurotic suffering from chronic insomnia who fre-
quently resorted to drugs and alcohol. Plaintiff had several irra-
tional phobias and her psychologist was concerned about the
possibility of suicide. Plaintiff at one point experienced problems
with her boyfriend and, with her psychologist leaving town, she
voluntarily entered Gulfport Memorial Hospital for medication to
relieve her depression. 42
Throughout this period she experienced no apparent problems
with her work or her caseload. Her immediate supervisor was clearly
satisfied with her good work but was concerned about her obvious
anxiety and agitation. She received further treatment for continued
depression but continued to do good work. 43
38. Gladys J. v. Pearland Indep. School Dist., 520 F. Supp. 869 (S.D. Tex. 1981)
(whether schizophrenic child was receiving free appropriate public education to which she
was entitled under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act and Rehabilitation Act
of 1973).
39. 704 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1983).
40. Id. at 1404.
41. Id.




The culmination of her experience in Mississippi came in No-
vember of 1979. Her 30th birthday was November 10th and her
psychologist was going out of town. She made statements to co-
workers, her psychologist and her friends that she would not "see"
her 30th birthday. Two days before her birthday she was taken by
police from her home to the psychiatric ward at Gulfport Memorial
Hospital. After interviews it was determined that she was suffi-
ciently dangerous to herself to warrant further commitment. Al-
though plaintiff's work performance was outstanding, defendants
did not contest the issue of whether the plaintiff was handicapped
within the meaning of section 504.44
Plaintiff's excellent work record suggests that defendants could
claim plaintiff was not protected under the Rehabilitation Act. Yet
it is unlikely they could overcome the substantial evidence of plain-
tiff's behavior away from the workplace. Given the indefinite degree
of impairment that results from a mental disability, plaintiffs al-
leging mental disability directly confronted the "catch-22" aspect of
the Rehabilitation Act. 41 Unless one has a definite history of mental
disorders, as did the plaintiff in Doe, it may be extremely difficult
to establish that one is sufficiently mentally impaired to be protected
but also still "otherwise qualified."
E. Sensitivity to Tobacco Smoke
Sensitivity to tobacco smoke can be distinguished from many
physical and mental disabilities. A tobacco sensitive plaintiff
may be encouraged to litigate a marginal case because of a very
different societal response to his allegations. For many persons
tobacco smoke, while not immediately disabling, creates an
uncomfortable environment. When the person genuinely debili-
tated by tobacco smoke steps forward and asserts a claim, that
person may find a significant support group cheering her on.
The many people who are either made uncornfortable or are
concerned about long term health effects of "secondary
smoke" 46 may rally behind this plaintiff and encourage a law-
suit because of their own interests. Rather than an avoidance
attitude arising, an identification process may occur. The
plaintiff may become a valued crusader, at least to some
44. Id. at 1408.
45. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
46. Secondary tobacco smoke is tobacco smoke that lingers in the air and is inhaled
by nonsmokers in close proximity.
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persons. Thus marginal claims may be filed and ultimately
litigated .47
More cases may be litigated because defendants will be more
willing to challenge the existence of an impairment. Defendants,
for instance, may have their own pro-smoking support groups. But
more importantly, tobacco smoke is generally not a byproduct of
or inherent to any particular job. Thus a defendant can no
longer concede impairment and argue subsequent burdens of proof.
Because tobacco smoke is not part of the job, a defendant could
not argue that sensitivity to tobacco smoke prevents plaintiff from
being "otherwise qualified." There remains the initial question of
whether sensitivity to tobacco smoke is a protected handicap.
Vickers v. Veterans Administration"' involved a United States
Veterans Administration employee who was unusually sensitive to
tobacco smoke. The employee's hypersensitivity limited him to en-
vironments that were completely smoke free. The court concluded
that his unusual sensitivity to tobacco smoke did in fact limit at
least one of his major life activities, his capacity to work in an
environment that was not completely smoke free. 49 The court did
not engage in a detailed analysis of what constitutes a major life
activity but instead concentrated upon whether the Veterans Admin-
istration had made a reasonable effort to accommodate the employee.
GASP v. Mecklenburg County" addressed whether a North
Carolina General Statute recognized persons as handicapped be-
cause they suffered discomfort and harm such as nasal and ocular
irritation, allergic reactions, and acceleration of heart disease when
they were in the presence of tobacco smoke. The court noted that
the North Carolina General Statutes did not specifically define
"handicapped person." 5' Accordingly, the court turned to the def-
initional section of the Rehabilitation Act and used that section as
a guide. In light of that statute, the court concluded:
It is manifestly clear that the legislature did not intend to in-
clude within the meaning of "handicapped persons" those people
47. However, there is also a disincentive in that the plaintiff will feel the wrath of
smokers. Additionally, to the degree litigation is being encouraged by an organized support
group, that group may be hoping to establish a binding precedent and thus initially would
encourage only the most severely affected plaintiffs and ignore marginal cases.
48. 549 F. Supp. 85 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
49. Id. at 86-87.
50. 42 N.C. App. 225, 256 S.E.2d 477 (1979).
51. Id. at 226, 256 S.E.2d at 478-79.
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with "any pulmonary problem" however minor, or all people
who are harmed or irritated by tobacco smoke. Therefore, the
class of plaintiffs as defined in the complaint does not con-
stitute a class of "handicapped persons" within the meaning
of G.S. 168-1, et seq., and the complaint was therefore properly
dismissed. We do not attempt to determine, in this opinion,
whether a class of persons with a particular pulmonary problem
or disease such as emphysema, would be considered "handi-
capped persons" . . . but only that the broad class of plaintiffs
defined in this complaint (i.e., persons who are harmed by
tobacco smoke) are not, as a class, handicapped persons ....
For the same reasons set forth above, the claim for relief based
upon 29 U.S.C. section 794 was properly dismissed. 2
It thus remains unclear whether sensitivity to tobacco smoke will
be regarded as a protected handicap. There appears to be a split
in authority developing. Where persons are afforded adequate pro-
tection by statutes or ordinances that limit smoking to carefully
defined locations, smoke sensitivity cases may not arise.53
F. Illness
Certain illnesses, such as cancer and cystic fibrosis, have such
a disabling effect on their victims that they are expressly protected
in the definitional section of the Rehabilitation Act.54 The defi-
nitional section is not exhaustive, however, as to which illnesses
have severe consequences and plaintiffs may be forced to prove
their protected status. If a disease is communicable, a plaintiff may
actively prevent disclosure to avoid isolation. If a disease is tem-
porary or transient, it may be difficult to establish that the illness
52. Id. at 227, 256 S.E.2d at 479.
53. For instance, the Minnesota Clean Indoor Air Act provides:
§ 144.414 Prohibitions.
No person shall smoke in a public place or at a public meeting except in
designated smoking areas. This prohibition does not apply in cases in which
an entire room or hall is used for a private social function and seating ar-
rangements are under the control of the sponsor of the function and not of
the proprietor or person in charge of the place. Furthermore, this prohibition
shall not apply to factories, warehouses and similar places of work not usually
frequented by the general public, except that the state commissioner of health
shall establish rules to restrict or prohibit smoking in those places of work
where the close proximity of workers or the inadequacy of ventilation causes
smoke pollution detrimental to the health and comfort of non-smoking em-
ployees.
54. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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substantially limits a major life activity." And because illnesses may
cause different symptoms in different persons, it may be difficult
to rely upon precedent.
Repeated health problems combined with an uncertain diagnosis
is apparently not sufficient to establish that one is a "handicapped
person." Stevens v. Stubbs16 concerned a plaintiff employed by
the Army and Air Force Exchange Service for approximately 14
years. During 1979 and 1980, he experienced health problems re-
quiring repeated absences. On September 6, 1979 exploratory sur-
gery aided in a diagnosis of his ailment. His physician stated that
complete recovery would take six to eight weeks. Plaintiff's su-
pervisor requested that plaintiff be reassigned because plaintiff's
performance, irrespective of his physical condition, was not ac-
ceptable. Plaintiff then requested his own transfer asserting that
his current assignment had created demands on his energy and may
have affected his health. The plaintiff's physician reported that he
saw no reason why plaintiff could not perform his duties. After
receiving a series of unsatisfactory performance reports, plaintiff
alleged discrimination based upon disability.1
7
The court observed that plaintiff did not suffer from a com-
monly recognized handicap. Rather, the nature of the alleged hand-
icap was somewhat uncertain. Plaintiff's supervisors did not believe
that plaintiff's absences were solely due to his illnesses, but instead
believed the absences resulted from his inability to cope with stress.
The warning periods and unsatisfactory performance reports, in
any case, did not begin until after plaintiff's physician certified him
as fully able to return to work. The court concluded:
At best the record shows only that plaintiff may have suffered
from an undisclosed transitory illness which may have required
him to take periods of sick leave. During the period he was
evaluated, however, he had been certified by his doctor as fit
for duty. Whatever the precise delineations of the term "im-
pairment" the court is unconvinced that it encompasses tran-
sitory illnesses which have no permanent effect on the person's
health.58
Even a chronic condition may not afford protection In Doss v.
General Motors Corporation,"9 the court held that a chronic in-
55. See supra note I I and accompanying text.
56. 576 F. Supp. 1409 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
57. Id. at 1414.
58. Id.
59. 25 F.E.P. Cases 419 (C.D. Ill. 1980).
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flammatory condition in both ears and a growth in one ear, which
caused the employee to suffer from impaired hearing, was merely
evidence of a condition of "ill-being" as opposed to a physical
condition. Therefore, plaintiff did not qualify as a handicapped
person within the meaning of Illinois Equal Opportunity for the
Handicapped Act. Although the case involved the interpretation of
a state statute, the decision is worth noting because it reveals that
courts may treat illnesses restrictively in an effort to avoid con-
fronting the uncertain aspects of an illness. The Illinois court reached
its decision in spite of the fact that the illness resulted in an arguably
protected hearing loss. 60 The Doss court reached its decision in
reliance upon Advocates v. Sears, Roebuck and Company, 61 which
involved a job applicant with a history of nephritis. This individual
had undergone a kidney transplant that restricted him from lifting
heavy weights. Nonetheless, he was found not to suffer from a
physical handicap within the meaning of the Illinois Constitution
and the Illinois Equal Opportunity for the Handicapped Act. 62 The
Advocates court acknowledged that the only physical impairment
the plaintiff claimed was a restriction on lifting heavy weights. It
stated that the General Assembly had only meant to protect those
physical and mental conditions that impose severe barriers on the
ability of an individual to perform major life functions. 6 The court
concluded that "[w]e do not believe that the disability alleged by
[plaintiff] is of the nature which falls within the commonly under-
stood meaning of the term 'physical handicap." ' 64
Although particular diseases are often not recognized as pro-
tected, if a disease is contagious there is a greater likelihood of
protection. If a disease is contagious, however, the court may be
more likely to find that the sufferer is not "otherwise qualified"
for a position. The disease may involve a documented risk to others
60. But see Doss v. General Motors Corp., 478 F. Supp. 139 (1979) (court stated at
hearing on pre-trial motion to dismiss that total loss of hearing in right ear and major
impairment of hearing in left ear was the type of handicap Illinois legislators sought to
protect).
61. 67 Ill. App. 3d 512 (1978).
62. Id. The Illinois Appellate Court admitted that it was reaching a conclusion that
conflicted with a prior decision from the neighboring state of Wisconsin. In Chrysler Out-
board Corp. v. Dept. of Industry, Labor and Human Relations, 14 F.E.P. Cases 344 (1976),
the Wisconsin Circuit Court held that an asthma sufferer was handicapped within the mean-
ing of the Wisconsin Fair Employment Code. See supra note 4.
63. 67 Ill. App. 3d at 516-17.
64. Id. at 518.
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that would prevent the sufferer from effectively performing a job.
The plaintiff in Arline v. School Board of Nassau County
5
was an elementary school teacher who had contracted tuberculosis
in 1957. After beginning her teaching career in 1966, she com-
petently performed her job for 14 years. However, she then suffered
three relapses of tuberculosis. The school dismissed her after her
third relapse. Alleging her susceptibility to tuberculosis made her
a "handicapped individual," she brought suit under section 504.
The district court held that she was not protected because the court
could not "conceive that Congress intended contagious diseases to
be included within the definition of a handicapped person."
66
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided, however,
that tuberculosis falls within both 29 U.S.C. section 706(7)(B) 67 and
45 C.F.R. section 84.3(j)(2)(i)(A). 6s The court found no objective
evidence to support the district court's conclusion because neither
the regulations nor statute gave any indication that chronic con-
tagious diseases are to be excluded. The court of appeals was re-
luctant to create an exception that would free recipients of federal
funds from any duty to even consider whether reasonable accom-
modation could be made to those afflicted with contagious dis-
eases .69
G. The "E.E. Black, Ltd." Approach to
Determining Who Is Handicapped
E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall 70 is an extremely important case
analyzing what a defendant must establish in order to rebut the
existence of a protected handicap. In that case, plaintiff brought
a claim under section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiff Crosby
was a 31 year old carpenter referred by his union to employer Black,
Ltd., a general construction contractor. Black required all ap-
prentice carpenter applicants to take a pre-employment physical
examination. When the employer's physician detected a congenital
65. 772 F.2d 759 (1lth Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 90 L. Ed. 2d 179 (1986).
66. Id. at 763.
67. Id. at 764. (physical or mental impairment which substantially limits ... major
life activities).
68. Id. (court found tuberculosis can significantly impair respiratory functions as well
as other major body systems).
69. Id. at 764. The court remanded the case for consideration of the question of
whether reasonable accommodation was possible or whether risks of infection precluded
teacher from being otherwise qualified. Id. at 765.
70. 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980).
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back anomaly, a partially sacralized transitional vertebra, plaintiff
was not recalled for an apprentice carpenter position. Plaintiff then
brought suit.
An administrative law judge concluded that plaintiff's medical
condition, as it existed, in no way impaired his present ability to
perform all of the physical functions of a carpenter's apprentice.
The medical dispute focused solely upon whether the condition would
tend to lead to back pain and injury in the future. The admin-
istrative law judge stated that the term "impairment" meant "any
condition which weakens, diminishes, restricts or otherwise damages
an individual's health or physical or mental activity." '7' The ad-
ministrative law judge concluded that although plaintiff had an
impairment, it had not been proven that this impairment substan-
tially limited a major life activity.
The administrative law judge further determined that Congress
was not attempting to protect people with any impairment, but
instead only those with the most disabling impairments. In other
words, a plaintiff must demonstrate that an impairment impedes
activities relevant to many or most jobs. Because the judge perceived
Crosby's impairment as only partially limiting his access to em-
ployment, the judge did not consider Crosby's condition severe
enough to allow recovery under the statute.
72
The plaintiff appealed the administrative law judge's decision
to the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Employment Standards. 71
The Assistant Secretary concluded that coverage under the Act did
not require a showing that the impairment impeded activities re-
lating to many or most jobs, but rather that protection under the
Act is extended to every individual with an impairment that, "is
a current bar to the employment of one's choice with a federal
contractor which the individual is currently capable of perform-
ing. " 74 The Assistant Secretary concluded that, because the per-
ceived impairment prevented Crosby from securing the job he
wanted, Crosby was a handicapped individual under the Rehabil-
itation Act.
71
The district court asserted that the Assistant Secretary's inter-
pretation of the Act and the regulations was overbroad. It stated
71. Id. at 1093.
72. Id. at 1093-94.
73. OFCCP v. E.E. Black, Ltd., 19 F.E.P. Cases 1624 (1979).
74. Id. at 1633.
75. 497 F. Supp. at 1095.
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that an individual with a fear of heights offered ten jobs with a
particular company but disqualified from one job because it was
on the 37th floor would be covered by the Act under the Assistant
Secretary's interpretation, in spite of the fact that nine job offers
were outstanding. 6 Similarly, an individual with a hearing sensi-
tivity denied employment at a noisy location, but offered a position
elsewhere, would also be covered by the Act. 77 This was not the
result intended by Congress. Otherwise, Congress would not have
used the terms substantial handicap or substantial limits. Congress
would instead have stated that the Act covered any handicap or
limitation.
The district court also concluded that the definition adopted by
the administrative law judge was invalid. That definition drastically
reduced the coverage of the Act. A person, for example, with a
graduate degree in chemistry but turned down for a chemist's job
due to his handicap would not likely be helped by the news that
he could still be a street car conductor. 78 A person who is dis-
qualified in his chosen field has a substantial handicap to em-
ployment and is substantially limited in a major life activity. The
court then declared the following test:
A handicapped individual is one who 'has a physical or mental
disability which for such individual constitutes or results in a
substantial handicap to employment.' . . . It is the impaired
individual that must be examined, and not just the impairment
in the abstract.
79
E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall establishes that one must focus on
the individual job seeker and not solely on the impairment or the
perceived impairment. This requires a case-by-case determination
of whether the impairment or perceived impairment of a rejected,
qualified job seeker constitutes for that individual a substantial
handicap to employment. Important factors include the number
and types of jobs from which the impaired individual is disqualified.
The court must examine the geographical area to which the ap-
plicant has access and take into account the person's own job ex-
pectations and training. If an individual is disqualified from the
same or similar jobs offered by employers throughout the area to






which he has reasonable access, then his impairment or perceived
impairment would result in a substantial handicap to employa-
bilityA8 The court affirmed its belief that Congress intended the
Rehabilitation Act to be broad in scope and intended that questions
as to coverage be answered on a case-by-case basis. The reduction
in the coverage of the Act proposed by the administrative law judge
would defeat this Congressional intent.
Thus the E.E. Black court established the rule that a specific
physical or mental condition that has the exact same effect on
different individuals may amount to a protected handicap for one
person and not for the other. In other words, the definition of
what is a protected handicap under the Rehabilitation Act is not
limited to literal descriptions of disabilities. To the degree that the
E.E. Black district court opinion becomes recognized as law in other
jurisdictions, most attempts to define protected handicaps solely
on the basis of the nature of the disability will not be successful.
The question of physical disability is one of degree. Several cases
involving impaired vision support this conclusion. Norcross v. Sneed'
involved a plaintiff possessing a congenital impairment leading
to 20/200 corrected visual acuity in one eye and unmeasureable
vision in the other eye. The little vision left in the second eye
resulted in double vision and distortion of the corrected vision in
the first eye. The plaintiff had no night vision. Plaintiff's op-
thamologist had certified her "legally blind" as had the federal
government for purposes of receiving federal benefits accorded to
blind persons. Faced with this evidence, the defendants wisely did
not question the plaintiff's condition and plaintiff was found to
be a "handicapped individual" within the meaning of the Reha-
bilitation Act.
82
Yet even if a particular impairment is acknowledged to exist,
it may not be sufficiently disabling to warrant protection. A plain-
tiff born with a mild case of strabismus, commonly known as
crossed-eyes, alleged unlawful discrimination in Jasany v. United
States Postal Service.83 Plaintiff had passed the Letter Sorter Ma-
chine Vision Examination and satisfied other requirements for the
position of Distribution Clerk Machine Trainee. He was hired and
began operating a mail sorting machine. After three months as a
80. Id. at 1101.
81. 573 F. Supp. 533 (W.D. Ark. 1983).
82. Id. at 536.
83. 755 F. 2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1985).
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mail sorting machine operator, plaintiff began to develop eye strain,
headaches, and excessive tearing. A physician's examination in-
dicated that plaintiff's symptoms were the result of the detailed
visual work required to operate the mail sorting machine combined
with his condition of strabismus. Plaintiff subsequently refused to
operate the mail sorting machine and was suspended from work.
After returning from his suspension, he again refused to operate
the machine. His employer then gave him a fitness for duty ex-
amination and found him to be disqualified for further employment
as a mail sorting machine operator. After his ensuing discharge,
plaintiff brought suit.
On appeal, defendants concentrated on the fact that plaintiff
had to establish not only that he suffered from a physical or mental
impairment but also that this impairment substantially limited a
major life activity. Defendants decided not to argue that the stra-
bismus was not a "physical or mental impairment." Rather, they
asserted the impairment did not substantially limit a major life
activity.
84
The court in Jasany engaged in a detailed analysis of E.E. Black,
Ltd. v. Marshall.8" The Jasany court agreed with the E.E. Black
court's conclusion that a determination of whether an impairment
substantially limits an individual's employment potential focuses
upon the number and type of jobs from which the impaired in-
dividual is disqualified, the geographical area to which the indi-
vidual has reasonable access, and the individual's job expectations
and training.8 6 The Jasany court asserted, however, that the E.E.
Black court did not adequately analyze the focus and relationship
of the definitional elements of the statute-impairment, substantial
limitation of a major life activity, and qualified person. The Jasany
court explained that it is part of the plaintiff's prima facie case to
establish the existence of an impairment that substantially limits a
major life activity.8" If the plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie
case, the defendant need not worry about addressing reasonable
accommodation.
8
In Jasany, the parties stipulated that plaintiff's condition had
never had any effect whatsoever on any of his activities, including
84. Id. at 1248.
85. 497 F. Supp. at 1098.
86. 755 F.2d at 1249.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1250.
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his past work history and ability to carry out other duties at the
post office apart from the mail sorting machine. Consequently, the
Jasany court found that the district court erred as a matter of law
in finding that the appellant Jasany was a handicapped person. In
fact, the court recognized the possibility that the strabismus was
so minor that it did not even rise to the level of a physical im-
pairment.8 9 Yet the court did not discuss whether this was a physical
impairment.
The court made it clear that the burden is on the plaintiff to
establish not only the existence of an impairment, but to also es-
tablish an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.
Because the strabismus had no effect on any of his other activities,
including his past work history and ability to carry out any other
duty at the post office, the court concluded that Jasany did not
establish that he was a handicapped person. 9°
H. Challenging an Allegation of Handicap
The reluctance of a defendant to challenge the existence of a
mental or physical impairment does not mean the defendant cannot
argue that a plaintiff is not a "handicapped individual" within the
meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. The defendant can explain that
although an impairment exists it does not substantially limit a major
life activity. Any plaintiff alleging that he or she is a handicapped
person within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act must be aware
that proving the existence of a physical or mental impairment alone
will not satisfy his burden of proof. A disabled person must also
be prepared to establish that his impairment affects a major life
activity.
There are three possible approaches for any defendant. First,
a defendant can challenge whether there is a physical or men-
tal impairment. This will probably involve substantial medical
investigation. Second, a defendant can concede an impairment
and argue, as defendants did in Jasany, that this impairment
does not substantially limit a major life activity. 9' Third, a
defendant can concede both impairment and substantial limita-
89. Id. at 1250 n.6.
90. Id. at 1250.
91. See also Oesterling v. Walters, 760 F.2d 859 (8th Cir. 1985) (court of appeals
recognized plaintiff's varicose veins as an impairment and that this condition affected her
ability to sit and stand, which are major life activities; the court refused, however, to reverse
the lower court's finding that these life activities were not substantially limited).
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tion and still argue that the plaintiff is not "qualified" 92 or not
"otherwise qualified."93
III. CONCLUSION
There is not an exhaustive body of case law revealing exactly
which disabilities will be considered as protected under the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973. Certain specific conditions are identified
as protected within the Rehabilitation Act and its accompanying
regulations. Defendants have tended not to challenge allegations
that these specific conditions exist. The Act protects alcoholics
and drug abusers when their substance use does not interfere with
performance or threaten others. If the plaintiff can establish a
mental disability, the Act may afford that disability protection.
Courts addressing the protection of transient and even chronic
diseases have not found such illnesses included within the Act's
scope, although one court found the Act to protect the conta-
gious disease of tuberculosis. The Act does not protect the con-
ditions of left-handedness and a particular body-weight acquired
as a result of weightlifting.
A plaintiff alleging a protected handicap not only must es-
tablish a physical or mental impairment but also must show this
impairment substantially limits a major life activity. Defendants
have successfully shown that certain conditions such as strabis-
mus do not substantially limit major life activities.
An effort to compile a definitive list of protected handicaps
is not likely to be successful. One must examine disabilities in
the context of the person having that disability. Furthermore, one
must determine the number and types of jobs from which a
plaintiff is disqualified, the geographical area to which the plain-
tiff has access, and the plaintiff's training, education and em-
ployment expectations.
92. Handicapped persons must be "qualified" under § 793.
93. Handicapped persons must be "otherwise qualified" under § 794.
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